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CAREMARK’S HIDDEN PROMISE
Ezra Wasserman Mitchell
In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a
director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of
jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this
literature parses the language of the case and those following, and
disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this
linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is
toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor
legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.
Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the
cases according to their damages claims reveals that, in fact, Delaware
courts have gone far toward extending the duty to monitor to business
risk, while at the same time doctrinally disavowing that they have done
so.
Closely related to this monitoring duty is the pre-conditional duty
of good faith, which is breached by directors’ knowledge of wrongdoing.
Once again, doctrine masks important distinctions that are revealed by
a close examination of the facts of the cases. Analysis reveals that
Delaware courts may be failing to make an important distinction with
regard to forms of notice. Making this distinction would help to shore up
the duty to monitor without imposing unreasonable demands on
directors.
These two lines of analysis lead to the conclusion that a meaningful
duty to monitor both legal and business risk is well along in development.
Extracting and reassembling the facts would realize Caremark’s original
promise.

 Professor of Law and Director, Commercial Law Center, Shanghai University of Finance
and Economics. My thanks go to Stephen Bainbridge, Joel Friedlander, Kent Greenfield, Frank
Partnoy, and Mark Poustie for insightful and helpful comments along the way. I am grateful for the
excellent research assistance provided by Feng Tian Geng. This research is sponsored by “Common
Law and Comparative Law” Innovation Program (No. 2016110396) of Shanghai University of
Finance and Economics.
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During the two decades following Chancellor William Allen’s
important opinion in In re Caremark International, Inc.,1 judges have
labored to make sense of its implications for the legal responsibilities
of the board of directors in a variety of contexts.2 Interesting scholarly
work has been done, from dismissals of the Caremark doctrine as
having no real teeth to the celebration of its recognition of meaningful
legal duties imposed on the board of directors.3 But, for several

1. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
2. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); Wood v.
Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008); Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013);
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009); In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 12, 2011); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re China
Agritech, Inc., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); Melbourne Mun.
Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund ex rel. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL
4076369, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017); In re The Dow Chemical
Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del Ch. Jan. 11, 2010); Reiter v. Fairbank,
No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No.
5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011); Sandys v. Pincus, No. 9512–CB, 2016
WL 769999 (Del Ch. Feb. 29, 2016); Ironworkers Dist. Council of Phila. & Vicinity Ret. & Pension
Plan v. Andreotti, C.A. No. 9714–VCG, 2015 WL 2270673 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2015); ATR-Kim
Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006). Other
courts, applying Delaware law, have engaged in a similar struggle.
3. FRANK PARTNOY, DELAWARE AND FINANCIAL RISK (Steven Davidoff Solomon &
Randall Thomas eds., 2017) (arguing that Caremark should be extended to cover financial risk);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009)
(evaluating the wisdom of extending Caremark claims to risk management); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Star Lopez, and Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55
UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008) [hereinafter Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith] (elucidating
the relationship between oversight jurisprudence and good faith); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016) (making a case that
regulatory compliance regimes are overtaking and transforming corporate governance); Hillary A.
Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate
Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763 (2016); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007) (praising Caremark for focusing boards on broader accountability);
H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post
Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L 1 (2001) (evaluating board’s place in monitoring regulatory
compliance); Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433 (2011) (favoring Delaware’s restraint in imposing
management accountability); Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and
Stone: The Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 344–45 (J.
Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (providing an evolutionary account of oversight liability and its
interplay with federal criminal law); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the Glue of
Capitalism: Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People’s Money,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 739 (2012) (observing a decay in managers’ personal
responsibility under Delaware law and calling for a restoration); Robert T. Miller, The Board’s
Duty to Monitor Risk after Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153 (2010) (making the case that
extending Caremark is tantamount to repealing the business judgment rule).

51.1 MITCHELL_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2019 5:16 PM

242

[Vol. 51:239

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

reasons grounded in articulated Delaware doctrine, it is rare for a
Caremark claim to pass the pleadings stage.4
Two stand out among these reasons. First, the articulation of
Caremark duties is limited to those circumstances in which corporate
damages have resulted from the assessment of criminal and regulatory
penalties as a consequence of corporate legal violations. As a doctrinal
matter, Caremark jurisprudence has yet to expand to address losses
caused by failed business decisions, which are the essence of the
corporation’s reason for being. Second, the scienter-based “not in
good faith” requirement that goes hand in hand with Caremark has led
to what I shall call a “jurisprudence of red flags.” This jurisprudence
overlooks subtle distinctions in types of information that may or may
not come to a board and the dramatic changes that have taken place in
the world of information technology since Caremark was decided. The
circumstances under which a Delaware court will find bad faith in an
oversight context are therefore highly limited.
I argue that the promise of Caremark lies in a sharper
understanding of the realities beneath the doctrine. The good news is
that Delaware’s Caremark cases already contain the necessary
elements to impose meaningful oversight duties on the board. They
simply need to be extracted and reassembled.
First, Delaware courts have already opened up Caremark
jurisprudence to the evaluation of business decisions, despite their
assertions to the contrary. To understand this, it is necessary to focus
on the damages sought in a number of Caremark cases and the board
behavior that allegedly proximately caused them. Second, while
Caremark itself focused only on alleged red flags arising from internal
monitoring,5 cases already have accepted externally-generated red
flags as plausible support for the necessary element of scienter that
establishes directorial bad faith. I shall demonstrate that external red
4. This fact has led two scholars to state that Caremark is declining in importance. Hillary
A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate
Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 773 (2016) (examining interplay between federal disclosure
regulation and oversight liability). Nonetheless, cases continue to be brought and judges continue
to evaluate the claims seriously. To be fair, it is rare for any litigation against directors to pass the
pleadings stage in Delaware except for litigation brought addressing conflict of interest claims,
claims one might call traditional loyalty cases. That said, Delaware doctrine has developed in this
context so the study of these cases remains the key to understanding Delaware law.
5. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963. This was also the case in Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), in which the Delaware Supreme Court
accepted Caremark as part of Delaware corporate law.
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flags may be considerably more available and informative for the
board than internal red flags, are easily and cheaply accessible, and
therefore should be taken seriously as a separate category of
monitoring tools.
Guiding Caremark jurisprudence towards more meaningful
monitoring duties also corrects for the possible judicial oversight of
the dramatic, and relatively recent, changes in the nature of the board
itself.6 Caremark was not only an important statement of law. It was
also a judicial recognition of the transformation of the role of the
board.7 Much of the history of twentieth-century corporate law is the
story of a board in search of a purpose, a board composed largely of
internal managers whose daily work significantly overlapped board
function.8 Before the 1970s, there was very little literature on the
function of the board in a public corporation and, indeed, precious
little literature about the board itself.9 But the political and economic
turmoil of the early part of that decade led to the start of a critical
examination of the board’s appropriate role. This culminated in the
creation of the modern monitoring board, as articulated by the
American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance and as
embraced by the Delaware courts throughout the 1980s and early
1990s.10 By the time Caremark was decided, the monitoring board was
a fact. Caremark arguably gave the monitoring board something to do.
But subsequent jurisprudence has left the board again in search of a
significant role.
Unlocking the promise of Caremark is important. In the absence
of a serious monitoring function, what is the board to do? 11 And if
6. I don’t mean to suggest that Delaware judges are unaware of these changes. Of course they
are. They helped to create them. What I am suggesting is that this transformation has been lost in
doctrinal rhetoric and needs to be rediscovered.
7. Jennifer Arlen acknowledges this in Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers,
Caremark, and Stone: The Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323,
342 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009).
8. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1568 (2007)
for an excellent history of the development of the monitoring board.
9. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., Cambridge University Press
2010) (providing a comprehensive history of legal interest in the board and the creation of the
modern monitoring board).
10. See also Gordon, supra note 8, at 1481.
11. See generally Mike Burkart et al., Why do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the
Absence of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 504/2017,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902617.
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there is little for the board to do, why do we have a board in the first
place? Perhaps it would be sufficient for shareholders directly to elect
a CEO who would be responsible for making business decisions and
coordinating regulatory compliance, presumably with the help of
external experts.12 Perhaps, and more plausibly, the growing world of
regulation and its demands for corporate compliance with external
requirements is the contemporary substitute for meaningful corporate
governance.13 Legal recognition of these possibilities has not yet
occurred, and for many reasons may be undesirable.
So we are now confronted with the same question Melvin
Eisenberg faced when he published The Structure of the
Corporation,14 the American Law Institute began its corporate
governance project,15 and Chancellor Allen issued Caremark: What is
the appropriate role of the board? And, unlike the situation
then-existing, corporate directors today are well compensated. It is
compensation they should earn.
The paper proceeds as follows: I will begin in Part I by following
the money. Caremark claims are derivative. The nature of the claimed
damages and the way the courts address them can tell us at least as
much about the meaning of Caremark as can the repeated recitation of
doctrine. This focus on damages requires an analysis of proximate
cause. Cases fall into four categories.
The first category contains what have been referred to as
“traditional Caremark claims” and contains those cases in which the
illegal conduct unquestionably proximately caused the corporation’s
losses. Criminal or civil penalties and fines were imposed.
The second category includes cases in which corporate losses
were allegedly due to the board’s failed business decisions in the
12. Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 275–
86 (2006).
13. Sean Griffith has convincingly demonstrated in a recent paper that the very nature of the
corporation as a private enterprise serving its constituents is being threatened by the web of external
federal and state regulation and the compliance regimes they impose. Griffith, supra note 3 at 2118–
40. Whatever one may think of Delaware’s relative laxity, its legislature and courts have created a
relatively coherent corporate law regime that functions, at least in a quotidian fashion. Professor
Griffith suggests that, once again, Delaware is facing a loss of that franchise as a result of these
developments. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003)
(describing the back and forth between Delaware and the federal government in creating corporate
law).
14. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(Beard Books 1976).
15. Culminating in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
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absence of illegal conduct (or in which potential illegal conduct was
irrelevant). Delaware doctrine claims it refuses to allow these kinds of
circumstances to sustain Caremark claims.16
The third category begins to demonstrate that, despite doctrine to
the contrary, Caremark jurisprudence already evaluates losses arising
from business risk. This category, blended cases, includes those cases
in which legal violations occurred and were related to the claimed
losses, but the losses arguably were proximately caused by other
factors, including poor business decisions. The principal importance
of illegality in these cases is to provide a doctrinal hook that permits
courts to elide the appearance of evaluating business decisions.17
The last category contains a single case: In re Massey Energy.18
The losses in Massey were related to legal violations but clearly would
have occurred even in the absence of a regulatory regime.19 Violation
of the law was not the proximate cause of the corporation’s losses.
Massey, I will argue, is the case that comes closest to opening up
Caremark jurisprudence to the possibility of fulfilling its promise by
imposing a monitoring duty on the board that covers all dimensions of
corporate operations, business as well as legal.
The extension of Caremark to business risk is also hampered by
doctrinal statements that obscure the actual distinction between
process and substance and have led courts to avoid review in perfectly
plausible business cases. Delaware courts have created a strong barrier
between evaluating the process by which boards make decisions and
evaluating the substance of those decisions. The cases dealing with
business risk seem grounded in the fear that evaluation of the
underlying board decisions would lead them to engage in the latter, a
fear which seems to arise from this doctrinal conflation.20 This has
16. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also In re The Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (noting that
the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet decided whether failure to monitor business risks is
enough to sustain a Caremark claim although noting that the court in Citigroup “seemed to suggest
the possibility of such a claim”). See generally PARTNOY supra note 3.
17. I am not arguing that the courts intentionally are hiding the ball. My argument, as it
proceeds, will show that adherence to doctrine masks the reality.
18. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
19. This is obviously true because, in Massey, the corporation failed to follow the regulatory
regime. See id. at *11.
20. The exception is the opinion in Dow Chemical where Chancellor Chandler clearly
articulates this distinction in a fairly straightforward case arguably involving legal risks. In re The
Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010).
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unnecessarily discouraged Delaware courts from applying Caremark
(which itself is about process) to evaluate the processes by which
business decisions are made. A focus on separating the process of
monitoring from the substance of monitoring will make this clear.
In Part II, I will examine the jurisprudence of red flags. The
presence of red (or sometimes yellow) flags provides the basis for the
directorial scienter necessary to sustain the bad faith portion of a
Caremark claim.21 But the doctrinal articulation of the concept of red
flags is too broad. Caremark, although it did not make this distinction,
focused on the existence of internal red flags.22 Subsequent cases have
also failed to make this distinction. But separating these flags into two
categories reveals important differences that, when understood, permit
a more subtle understanding of good faith.
Dividing red flags into internal and external red flags (or
internally and externally-generated information) leads to the
conclusion that there is little justification for exculpating boards from
the responsibility to know what is reasonably at hand.23 In the process,
I will show that Delaware courts already have accepted the presence
of external red flags as a predicate for liability. This should be made
explicit and external flags treated as an independent category.
Delaware courts might resist this distinction for fear of making
directors responsible for knowing too much information or digging up
obscure information. There should be no fear. Just as the board has
transformed over the past four decades, dramatic changes in the way
we access information have taken place since Caremark. Technology
has made the process of gathering and sorting information a
21. As Stephen Bainbridge and his coauthors have pointed out, and the Delaware courts have
embraced, Caremark claims are, essentially, claims that directors acted in bad faith. Stephen M.
Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith, supra note 3.
22. There was no need to on the facts of the case. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
23. Delaware jurisprudence only credits red flags ‘waved in one’s face’ of directors or
displayed so as to be apparent to a careful observer. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008).
But see Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016)
(holding demand not futile where board failed to act after learning about evidence of criminal
corporate behavior); In re China Agritech, Inc., 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); In re
Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (noting failure of board to act
meaningfully in reaction to the presence of red and yellow flags in what the court saw as a corporate
business plan predicated on the violation of mine safety laws); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg,
965 A.2d 763, 798–99 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing how the board tolerated “inadequate internal
controls and knowingly fail[ed] to monitor their subordinates’ compliance with legal duties” in the
context of a corporation operated as a “criminal organization.”). I will argue that this “face waving”
doctrine disregards the transformation of information technology.
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considerably easier and much cheaper task than it was when Caremark
was decided. I will argue that the courts should incorporate these
changes into the board’s duties.
Part III concludes.
I. TYPES OF RISK
The cases and literature on Caremark generally have focused on
doctrinal statements about the nature and extent of Caremark duties
and have paid little attention to the nature of the damages at issue. In
particular, they have not examined the requisite links between the
allegedly failed directorial monitoring and the losses that such failures
are said to have caused. This is not surprising. Most Caremark cases
never make it past the pleadings stage and so the question of damages
does not come up in an actionable way. As a result, the extent to which
Delaware courts already have expanded Caremark jurisprudence is
obscured. A study of the cases is instructive.
I categorize the cases in terms of the kind of risk at issue,
following the doctrinal distinction between legal risk and business risk
employed by the courts. The reality is more nuanced, and reveals that
the cases align along a spectrum. Delaware courts have gone a long
way toward incorporating business losses (in addition to legal losses)
resulting from failed or inadequate monitoring of bad business
decisions into their evaluations of Caremark claims. In one case, the
Chancery Court has gone so far as to accept the failure to monitor
business risk as a basis for such a claim.24
A. Legal Risk
The first type of case addresses what is generally known as legal
risk and has sometimes been referred to as a “traditional Caremark
claim.”25 Legal risk is simply the possibility that employees of the
corporation might cause it to violate positive law, resulting in
substantial criminal or civil penalties and sometimes judgments in
favor of private parties.26 For obvious reasons, this kind of risk is
greatest for corporations operating in regulated industries, and the
cases generally reflect this. Traditional Caremark cases present little
question that the illegal conduct at issue was the proximate cause of
24. In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484, 497 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2017).
25. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009).
26. In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 at *5 (Del Ch. Jan. 11, 2010).
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the corporate losses for which derivative plaintiffs seek redress. The
fines and penalties for which plaintiffs seek corporate reimbursement
were the direct result of illegal conduct.
Caremark itself is too well known to merit extensive discussion.
Briefly, Caremark is a major health care company, engaged in patient
care and managed services as well as various therapeutic services and
prescription drug plans. The company earned substantial revenue from
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.27 It was therefore required to
comply with a variety of regulations, including the federal AntiReferral Payments Law (“ARPL”).28 While attempting to comply with
these regulations, Caremark took the position that there were
ambiguities in determining the limits of such laws and publicly stated
that it was uncertain of its own interpretations.29 It appears that
Caremark chose to operate its business somewhat aggressively.
In any event, Caremark found itself under investigation by the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Justice, resulting in a federal grand jury indictment, the discovery of
violations, substantial fines and civil damages, and a comprehensive
settlement that included Caremark’s obligation to improve its
monitoring practices.30 Derivative litigation followed the indictment
and resolved in the settlement at issue in the case.31
The Chancellor’s obligation to approve the settlement included a
central determination of whether that settlement was “fair and
reasonable,” a determination that necessarily required that he evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of the derivative claims.32 The central
legal question was whether the directors had breached “their duty of
attention or care,” “possibly the most difficult theory in corporate law
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,”33 difficult
because, as the Chancellor had written in Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l
Inc.,34 any other liability standard would distort the risk/reward

27. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 962.
30. Id. at 962–66.
31. Id. at 966.
32. Id. at 966–72.
33. Id. at 967.
34. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). I will address this particular bit of Delaware mythology
later in this paper.
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calculus of corporate directors leading to a dearth of qualified
candidates willing to serve.35
Important for this paper and subsequent jurisprudence is the
Chancellor’s careful distinction between judicial evaluation of the
wisdom of the board’s decision—which can never be questioned
absent a fiduciary breach—and the nature of the process used to arrive
at the decision, which can always be open to judicial evaluation. Thus,
he looked at the processes by which the board established internal
monitoring procedures to determine whether it had adequately
performed its oversight role.36 Despite its failure to detect the illegal
activity at issue, he concluded that it had.37
Important, too, is the court’s focus on the fact that the risks at
issue were legal risks, a focus that “has been given special importance
by an increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the
criminal law to assure corporate compliance with external legal
requirements . . . .”38 External legal requirements had also been at
issue in the 1963 case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,39 a case that held
the board only to the standard of actual notice of illegal activity for
liability to be imposed. The court here rejected that standard in favor
of one that required the board to assure itself of the existence within
the corporation of reasonable information and reporting systems, and
thus gave birth to oversight liability.40
Despite this focus on legal compliance, the Chancellor left open
the possibility that such information and reporting systems might be
required to provide monitoring of other risks, noting that information
and reporting systems sufficient to satisfy the board’s duty must
represent “a good faith attempt to provide senior management and the
Board with information respecting material acts, events, or conditions
within the corporation, including compliance with applicable statutes

35. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (citing Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1996)). The observation of directors’ risk/reward calculus, often articulated as a fear that
too high a standard of liability would discourage qualified directors from serving, is something of
a mantra in Delaware jurisprudence. Yet I have never seen a Delaware court cite any evidence
whatsoever to support its own resolutions of this calculus.
36. Id. at 963.
37. Id. at 972.
38. Id. at 969.
39. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
40. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
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and regulations.”41 Yet no subsequent Delaware case in which the
risks at issue were described as other than legal risks has survived a
motion to dismiss.
This is probably because no such case has presented sufficient
evidence of board failure, of the presence of adequate red and yellow
flags to alert the board to the possible failure of its information
systems. But I suspect there is more. As I will discuss below, the court
in the important Citigroup case, despite its care, elided (as a matter of
fact, not of doctrine) the distinction between reviewing process and
reviewing substance that the Chancellor was at pains to make in
Caremark.42 This has led, despite some ambiguous language, to an
unnecessary inference that Caremark duties are centered on legal risks
alone.43
The Delaware Supreme Court’s canonization of Caremark in
Stone v. Ritter was a case involving legal risks similar to the type of
risks posed in Caremark itself, that is to say external legal risk.44
Similarly, the damages at issue—fines and regulatory penalties—were
proximately caused by employee misconduct.45 Custodial account
holders at AmSouth Bancorporation managed a Ponzi scheme in the
face of corporate failure to comply with the federal Bank Secrecy Act
and anti-money laundering regulations because employees did not file
required suspicious activity reports.46 The result was indictment of the
bank followed by a deferred prosecution agreement under which it
paid significant fines and additional civil penalties as a result of
regulatory prosecution.47 Derivative litigation followed.
The Supreme Court accepted the Chancery Court’s
characterization of the matter as a “‘classic Caremark claim . . . [,] a
claim of directorial liability for corporate loss . . . predicated upon
41. Id. at 969 (emphasis added); see also Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith, supra
note 3 (noting Allen’s statement that monitoring was to cover not only legal risk but business
performance).
42. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972.
43. I discuss Citigroup in the following section. In Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506
(Del. Ch. 2003), then-Vice Chancellor Strine noted that Caremark “is rightly seen as a prod towards
the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporations’ compliance with legal
standards . . . .”
44. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Indeed the
ur-case on the duty to monitor, Graham, 182 A.2d at 127, also dealt with external regulation—in
that case, the anti-trust laws.
45. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 365–66.
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ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . .”48
“Liability creating activities” are, of course, violations of law.
Accepting the conclusions of an independent report of the bank’s
internal compliance monitoring systems, or at least concluding that the
board could reasonably have accepted its conclusions that such
systems were adequate, the court held that the complaint was properly
dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to make demand.49 It was important to
the decision that the members of the board were untainted by interest,
dependence, or the substantial likelihood of liability. 50 The court had
little more to say on the matter, essentially embracing the language
and reasoning of Caremark itself.51
B. Business Risk
The next category of risk is business risk. Business risk cases
present situations where the plaintiff seeks to redress losses
proximately caused by business decisions that turned out badly. The
argument is that these losses would not have occurred but for the
board’s failure to monitor the corporation’s business.
If legal risk characterizes traditional Caremark claims, claims
based on business risk doctrinally appear to remain beyond the Pale.
These, it is said, are claims that Delaware jurisprudence will never
48. Id. at 364.
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id. at 367.
51. It had quite a lot to say on the issue of good faith. See infra note 167–171 and
accompanying text. Similar cases involving straightforward legal risks include: Horman v. Abney,
C.A. No.12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) (dismissing a straightforward
Caremark claim based on penalties and fines for regulatory violations because of inadequate
particularized pleadings); Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18,
2016) (straightforward legally-based Caremark claim alleging board’s failure to detect violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act, while reciting the Delaware mantra that Caremark duties are grounded in
legal risk and not business risk); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund on Behalf of
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d,
158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017) (demand not excused as to Caremark claim for allowing antitrust
violations when no particularized facts demonstrated that directors failure to act in the face of three
red flags constituted bad faith); Ironworkers Dist. Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity Ret. &
Pension Plan v. Andreotti, C.A. No. 9714–VCG, 2015 WL 2270673 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2015)
(finding a violation of intellectual property laws and breach of licensing agreement). There are facts
in the opinion that might suggest this case could be seen as a blended case, but it is unclear if it
would be more appropriate to treat it as a legal case. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367; La. Mun. Police Emps.’
Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss straightforward
Caremark claim based on criminal and regulatory violations and resulting penalties and fines); see
also In re Duke Energy Corp., No. 7705-VCG, 2016 WL 4543788 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2016)
(upholding a straightforward bad faith claim against a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss because of the
well-pled allegations that the board had knowingly caused the corporation to violate positive law).
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permit because it is for the boards, not the courts, to make business
decisions, and monitoring business risk appears to be treated as a
business decision. Courts may only review process. Thus, courts in the
few straightforward business risk cases refuse to review these
decisions as breaching Delaware’s divide between substance and
process review.52
As I have already noted, Caremark expressly left open the
possibility that board failure to monitor business risk could lead to
oversight liability.53 A duty to monitor business risk makes sense.
Directors are chosen for their business expertise, not their legal
expertise. And while criminal and regulatory penalties can often be
substantial, they rarely are so great as to destroy or even severely
cripple a corporation. Bad business decisions do have that potential.
Among the few tasks for which the monitoring board unquestionably
is responsible is monitoring the CEO. What does that monitoring
entail? His business success. At least to this extent, the board is already
responsible for monitoring business risk. To limit enforceable
monitoring, then, to legal risk thus implies a very different, and
somewhat peculiar, notion of the corporation.54 The question is
whether the duty to monitor goes beneath the CEO’s business
performance.
The 2009 Citigroup case was one of several derivative actions
brought by shareholders following the 2008 financial crisis.55
Plaintiffs sought to impose liability on the corporation’s directors for
failing adequately to monitor and manage its exposure in the subprime
mortgage market (and for failing to assure thorough and accurate
financial reporting).56 Plaintiffs pled demand futility, alleging the
board’s substantial risk of liability because of its disregard of

52. There is little point in attempting to review these cases from a proximate cause perspective
because they are dismissed on the very nature of the claims as evaluating inappropriate risk.
Citigroup implicitly rejected any notion of the failure to monitor as proximate cause by holding
that the alleged red flags were irrelevant to the company. Goldman, as I will soon discuss, has a
more plausible connection. Nonetheless, the cases are important for the analysis of the blended
cases I discuss below.
53. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
54. Professor Griffith already sees potentially dangerous changes in corporate purpose arising
from rapidly evolving and pervasive regulatory regimes. Griffith, supra note 3.
55. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 2009).
56. Id. at 114.
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significant red flags that ought to have put it on notice that it should
pay greater attention to this risk.57
In holding that demand was not excused, and thus dismissing the
case, the court distinguished Caremark, noting that a traditional
Caremark claim involved the failure of a board to monitor violations
of the law, whereas the complaint here was based upon the
“defendants’ alleged failure to properly monitor Citigroup’s business
risk . . . .”58 Although the court noted that it might be possible for a
plaintiff to sustain the burden of proving a Caremark claim regarding
business risk under some set of facts,59 this seems implausible in light
of the court’s central reasoning, which I quote at length:
Although these claims are framed by plaintiffs as Caremark
claims, plaintiffs’ theory essentially amounts to a claim that
the director defendants should be personally liable to the
Company because they failed to fully recognize the risk
posed by subprime securities. When one looks past the lofty
allegations of duties of oversight and red flags used to dress
up these claims, what is left appears to be plaintiff
shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants
personally liable for making (or allowing to be made)
business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly for
the Company. Delaware Courts have faced these types of
claims many times and have developed doctrines to deal
with them—the fiduciary duty of care and the business
judgment rule. These doctrines properly focus on the
decision-making process rather than on a substantive
evaluation of the merits of the decision. This follows from
the inadequacy of the Court, due in part to a concept known
as hindsight bias, to properly evaluate whether corporate
decision-makers made a “right” or “wrong” decision.60
Were there any question that the Chancellor understood
Caremark to be limited to legal claims, such doubt was erased two
pages later.
To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to
succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to
57.
58.
59.
60.

I discuss the issue of red flags separately in Part II.
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 124.

51.1 MITCHELL_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2019 5:16 PM

254

[Vol. 51:239

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform
a hindsight evaluation of the reasonableness or prudence of
directors’ business decisions. . . . To impose liability on
directors for making a ‘wrong’ business decision would
cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking
business risks. “Indeed, this kind of judicial second guessing
is what the business judgment rule was designed to prevent,
and even if a complaint is framed under a Caremark theory,
this Court will not abandon such bedrock principles of
Delaware fiduciary duty law.”61
With such powerful statements of director-protective Delaware
judicial policy, it is hard to imagine a case of business risk
monitoring that could sustain a plaintiff’s complaint.62
I suppose it is possible to read this language as the court’s
interpretation of the complaint as alleging a failed business decision
rather than a failure to monitor. But that possibility is undercut by at
least two observations. First, the court opened its opinion by
describing the claim as a failure to monitor, thus at least implicitly
recognizing the distinction that it later elided between judicial review
of the monitoring procedures and processes and the substantive
business decision to enter the subprime market.63
Second, the red flags asserted by plaintiffs also pointed to a duty
to monitor rather than to the substance of the decision. The red flags
that were pled did not specifically point to Citigroup’s investment
behavior but to the risks of the subprime market more generally. These
risks—these red flags—had nothing to do with Citigroup itself, as the
court hastens to point out.64 That is all the more reason to read the
61. Id. at 126.
62. See In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010)
(refusing to evaluate the board’s decision to agree to an unconditional merger as a “business
decision,” despite its failure to note possible bribery that could have affected the results of the deal).
63. The opinion acknowledges this in its second sentence. “Plaintiffs brought this action . . .
alleging, in essence, that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to properly
monitor and manage the risks the Company faced in the subprime lending market . . . .” In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111.
64. Id. at 114–15. “As will be more fully explained below, the ‘red flags’ alleged in the eightysix page Complaint are generally statements from public documents that reflect worsening
conditions in the financial markets, including the subprime and credit markets, and the effects of
those worsening conditions had on market participants, including Citigroup’s peers.” Id. at 114–
15; see also id. at 128 (repeating this analysis). I will discuss in Part II why these red flags should
have been sufficient.
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complaint as alleging a monitoring failure rather than a decisional
failure. If plaintiffs had indeed been alleging the latter, the evidence
would have to have been directed at internal Citigroup decisionmaking. It was not.
It is, perhaps, understandable that the court conflated the two
types of decisions. Delaware courts are famously averse to the
possibility of appearing to evaluate the substance of corporate
business decisions, frequently asserting their lack of business
expertise and the undesirability of hindsight evaluations of risky
decisions that may have been rational at the time they were made but
turned out rather badly.65
But Delaware courts do evaluate corporate business decisions, at
least in non-loyalty cases, on the basis of process. That is, in fact, the
very posture of the business judgment rule that by definition arises in
cases that challenge business decisions. Although it may be argued
that the business judgment rule covers business decisions made at the
board level and Caremark monitoring looks at decisions made deeper
in the enterprise, there is little reason to distinguish the board’s process
of establishing monitoring mechanisms for (arguably more
consequential) business risks from its process of establishing
monitoring mechanisms to ensure legal compliance.
Evaluating the decision-making process of a board of directors is
precisely what Delaware courts do all the time. The lifeblood of the
Delaware courts from a corporate law perspective is a stream of
derivative cases alleging that decisions made by a corporation’s board
should lead to the board’s liability. Although the enactment of section
102(b)(7) permitting exculpatory charter provisions largely has
eradicated direct care claims,66 this kind of review survives in
everything from derivative demand analysis to cases reviewing
executive compensation,67 to takeover cases, to Caremark itself. In
those cases, courts regularly reiterate that what they are doing is
reviewing the process by which a board made a decision, not the
decision itself.68

65. I hasten to point out that Delaware courts protest too much, employing their own business
judgment in cases where demand is alleged to be futile. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981).
66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018).
67. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
68. See id. at 52.
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Would the result have been different had the court evaluated the
Citigroup case on this basis rather than dismissing it as the kind of
business decision courts will not review? Citigroup was relatively
easy, because there is no evidence in the opinion that the board had
made an affirmative decision to enter the subprime market, nor does it
appear that plaintiffs made such an allegation. The result would likely
have been the same. But the contours of the board’s monitoring
responsibilities would have been broader.
Goldman Sachs69 is different. The board there did make an
affirmative decision by approving the employee compensation plan
that was at issue in the case.70 The court refused to review the board’s
failure to monitor the compensation regime, identifying the issue as
inviting the kind of business decision review declined in Citigroup.71
But it would have been perfectly consistent with Delaware
jurisprudence for the court to have asked whether the compensation
scheme was of a nature to require monitoring mechanisms and to
evaluate any process the board might have used to consider this
question. I discuss Goldman further in the subsection immediately
following.
C. Blended Risk
Cases have been brought that go beyond traditional Caremark
claims and deal with the board’s failure to monitor other kinds of risks.
While, unsurprisingly, the typical result is dismissal, some of these
cases fully evaluate the Caremark claim at the pleading stage without
analyzing the nature of the alleged wrong or the types of damages
sought. In fact, as Vice Chancellor Laster wrote in Pyott, a case
decided after Citigroup, “[t]he list of corporate traumas for which
stockholders theoretically could seek to hold directors accountable is
long and ever expanding: regulatory sanctions, criminal or civil fines,
environmental disasters, accounting restatements, misconduct by
officers or employees, massive business losses, and innumerable other
potential calamities.”72 Although the Vice Chancellor used the word
“theoretically,” he did so citing Caremark itself, with no reference to
69. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 12, 2011).
70. Id.
71. Id. at *22.
72. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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Citigroup.73 Oversight liability for failed business decisions appears
to remain plausible. A close examination of the cases demonstrates
that courts have already, at least implicitly, allowed these claims to be
made.74
I refer to these cases as blended cases because, in each of them,
some sort of legal violation was present, but losses caused by the legal
violations, if any, were only part of the damages for which plaintiffs
sought recompense. Damages were also sought, sometimes generally
and sometimes more specifically, for losses caused by bad business
oversight. Thus, while the cases do not explicitly embrace oversight
monitoring of business risk, they do illustrate the difficulty of isolating
the proximate cause of damages, or at least all of the damages, in
oversight liability cases.
Rich v. Chong75 is a case suggesting that Caremark jurisprudence
goes beyond the traditional fact pattern and would appear to impose a
duty to monitor internal financial controls as well, a monitoring
function that clearly implicates business risk as well as legal risk. The
damages claimed in Rich proximately resulted from corporate
mismanagement, although regulatory action had begun.
Rich was a derivative suit brought by the shareholder of a
Delaware holding company, the sole asset of which was Fuqi, a
Chinese jewelry company.76 Less than a year after its initial public
offering, the company announced a restatement of its financials.
Additional negative disclosures followed the plaintiff’s prompt
demand on the board, as a result of all of which the price of the stock
dropped from its IPO level of $21.50 a share in July 2009 to $1 at the
time the case was heard in 2013.77 The board failed to respond to
73. Id. at 340 (“[O]rdinary business decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper
in the interior of the organization can . . . vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability
to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959
(Del. Ch. 1996).
74. It is possible to over-read some of these cases because few have made it past the pleadings
stage and none of them have resulted in an opinion evaluating liability on the merits of the case. In
blended cases, however, the courts have not relied upon (and rarely have discussed) the nature of
the damages as a reason to dismiss the claims the way the court did in Citigroup. That the cases are
blended, that is, including law violations as well as failed business decisions, may be the reason for
this, but it nonetheless stands that significant business losses resulting from risky decisions
characterize these cases.
75. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013).
76. Id. at 966.
77. Id. The drop in share price is, of course, not a proper form of damages to be sought under
a derivative claim.
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plaintiff’s demand for two years, although it did appoint a special
internal investigation committee whose activities were halted when
the corporation failed to pay its outside auditor, counsel, and forensic
specialists, and its members resigned (as did four of its seven directors
and three of its officers).78
The court had little trouble permitting the plaintiff to pursue his
Caremark claim, despite the fact that the board had not yet responded
to his demand nor had the special committee completed its
investigation.79 The board’s abandonment of its investigation,
especially in the face of apparent financial wrongdoing (and when the
corporation publicly admitted that its internal controls were
inadequate) was an abdication of board responsibility sufficient to
remove the protection of the business judgment rule because of an
apparent failure of the board to act in good faith.80
The court also refused to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim under Caremark, reciting the now-familiar Stone v. Ritter
mantra that “[t]he essence of a Caremark claim is a breach of the duty
of loyalty arising from a directors’ bad-faith failure to exercise
oversight control over the company.”81 Applying the plaintiff-friendly
standards of Rule 12(b)(6) (having gotten over the more difficult
hurdle of Rule 23.1 because of the board’s abdication of its
investigation), the court enumerated the corporation’s own various
admissions of the inadequacy of its internal financial monitoring
systems, leading the court to conclude that Fuqi had “no meaningful
controls in place.”82 The court also found sufficient red flags to permit
the inference that the directors knew that Fuqi’s internal controls were
inadequate, thus satisfying the scienter requirement necessary to
establish the lack of good faith that sustains a Caremark claim.83
The damages claimed are telling. The case was pled as one
involving the board’s failure to establish a meaningful system of
internal controls, leading to misstatements in SEC filings and an SEC
investigation.84 The company had sustained no damages from legal
78. Id. at 972.
79. Id. at 973.
80. Id. at 978.
81. Id. at 980.
82. Id. at 983.
83. Id. at 984.
84. Verified Derivative Complaint at 2, Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 25, 2013) (No 7616-VCG), 2012 WL 2357870.
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fines and penalties at the time of filing, and the complaint reflects this
by asking for damages “including, but not limited to, costs and
expenses incurred in connection with the accounting restatement
process, the SEC’s investigation and the Company’s NASDAQ
delisting proceedings.”85 More broadly, and apparently contemplating
additional unspecified damages, it demands that the company be
awarded “the amount of damages sustained by the Company as a result
of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty.”86 Among
those damages that later were alleged were the Company’s payment
of $120 million to an unidentified Chinese party that appears simply
to have disappeared.87 This payment does not, on its face, appear to be
a result of legal or regulatory violations, and thus can be seen as
constituting a loss resulting from a business risk that does not fit the
pattern of a traditional Caremark claim. The claim is that the board
failed to monitor the corporation’s internal financial practices leading
to its failure to uncover the financial mismanagement. Thus, Rich
appears to accept an expanded board oversight role.88
Several other cases are similar. Desimone v. Barrows89 dealt with
corporate harm due to option backdating, and Goldman Sachs90
addressed management compensation practices, although neither case
survived a motion to dismiss.91 In contrast, AIG92 survived the
pleadings stage.
The wrongdoing in Desimone was brought to light by an SEC
investigation, leading Sycamore Networks, Inc. to have to restate its
85. Id. at ¶ 73.
86. Id.
87. Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Rich ex
rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. 7616-VCG), 2012 WL
4293959.
88. Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2004), overruled by Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010). In Saito, the Caremark claim
survived a motion to dismiss, and thus might fall into the same category, but it is unclear from the
opinion and an earlier opinion in the case, Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341
(Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000), what the nature of the damages sought were. Although the action was
derivative, the only corporate harm discussed was a drop in share price. See also Canadian
Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, 2006 WL 456786 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006)
(dismissing Caremark claims alleging failure to monitor internal fiduciary self-dealing transactions
on other grounds).
89. 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).
90. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1–2
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
91. In Desimone, part of the complaint survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss but not a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 947, 950.
92. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del Ch. 2009).
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earnings. Plaintiff also had discovered the existence of an internal
memo suggesting that options granted to six “rank and file employees”
were backdated to the lowest trading price in the quarter preceding the
grants, which memo led the corporation’s Audit Committee to launch
an internal investigation.93 Plaintiff also alleged backdated grants to
Sycamore’s officers and outside directors.94
The court disposed of the Caremark aspect of the complaint by
observing that the complaint failed to allege any facts suggesting the
inadequacy of Sycamore’s internal controls, and the absence of any
red flags that would have created the requisite scienter to sustain a
finding that the directors had “abdicated their oversight
responsibilities by failing to take remedial action.”95 The court
apparently found no need to discuss the nature of the harm to the
corporation itself or, relatedly, the type of monitoring in which the
board was to engage. It does appear, however, that the principal
complaint as to the relief sought for the corporation through the
derivative action could not have been a drop in stock price caused by
the restated financials because that was harm caused to the
stockholders and thus the subject of a direct action rather than a
derivative action.
The complaint makes this clear. Among the damages alleged to
be suffered by the company were underpayment by the employees to
the corporation upon exercise of their backdated options.96 When
options are granted below market price, “then the employee pays less
and the company gets less money for the stock when the option is
exercised.”97 And while exposure to regulatory penalties was also
alleged, plaintiffs sought payment of “substantial monetary damages
as a result of the [defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty] . . . as well
as further and even greater damage in the future, including damage to
the Company’s reputation, business, and good will.”98
The same is largely true for Goldman Sachs, in which a claim for
demand futility also failed. While the court treated Goldman as a
93. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 922–23.
94. Id. at 914.
95. Id. at 940.
96. Id. at 913.
97. Amended Derivative Action Complaint, Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch.
June 7, 2007) (No.2210-VCS), 2006 WL 4780283, at 2.
98. Id. at 22, 30. Also alleged was a generalized complaint that “the Company has sustained
and will continue to sustain significant damages in the millions of dollars.” Id. at 34.
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business risk case, I analyze it here because the complaint’s assertion
of unethical (although not illegal) conduct by Goldman employees
was an obvious attempt to bring the case within traditional Caremark
doctrine and the losses claimed were clearly proximately caused by
business decisions.
The central complaint in Goldman was that the compensation
structure established by the board created a divergence between the
interests of management and the interests of outside stockholders,
creating incentives for management to increase net revenue without
regard to the risks.99 Having created this system, the complaint
alleged, the board breached its Caremark duties by failing to monitor
management appropriately in light of the compensation scheme it had
approved.100 The losses proximately caused by the alleged board
oversight failures were business losses, not fines and penalties.101
The case is notable, for my purposes, for two points made by the
court, and one that is implicit in the decision. First, the court noted that
the risky conduct engaged in by management might have been
unethical but it was not illegal as contemplated by Caremark.
Management was permitted to pursue such legal conduct, despite the
risk of ethical violations, so reports about risk did not raise red flags
for monitoring from the perspective of the board.102
Second, the court recognized the board’s decisions as business
monitoring decisions in contrast to legal monitoring decisions. Stating
that Citigroup had left open the question of whether the board had a
duty to monitor business risk, the court stated that if a duty to monitor
business risk existed, the court would not be permitted to look at the
substance of the decision at all.103 This is an important observation,
and the only statement I have found in Caremark business risk cases
clearly to acknowledge the difference between procedure and
substance in evaluating the kinds of corporate behavior the board is
obliged to monitor. Goldman thus leaves open a path to the court’s

99. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *3
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
100. Second Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint at *79, In re The Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc., 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (No. 5215-CC), 2010 WL 5069059.
101. Indeed, among the damages alleged was repayment by the defendants of over-payments
of compensation to employees. Id. at *79.
102. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *20
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
103. Id. at *22.
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eventual recognition that its evaluation of a board’s monitoring of nonlegal risks does not necessarily (or even logically) entail an
examination of the business risks themselves.
Indeed, it would have been an important correction to a
significant dimension of corporate behavior Caremark did not
address, a correction that could then have made Caremark evaluation
more meaningful and complete. The issue is one of incentives. Legal
and regulatory regimes, by threatening corporations with penalties for
violation, create exogenous incentives for corporations to obey the
law. Compensation regimes create endogenous incentives for
employees to work to increase corporate profit. While compensation
arguably leading to corporate damages was squarely at issue in
Goldman, it is probable that the structure of Caremark’s compensation
system (and that of AmSouth Bancorporation and so many other
corporations) rewarded individual employee success in increasing
profits.104 It doesn’t take much to understand that these compensation
incentives can undercut exogenous legal incentives, especially when
considered from the perspective of an individual employee in a large
organization rather then the perspective of the organization itself.
While the conduct in Goldman was alleged to be unethical rather than
illegal, a discussion of the role of compensation schemes in the
monitoring context would have been helpful and important. But the
court foreclosed the possibility of this analysis by labeling the decision
an un-analyzable business decision.105 This missed opportunity for a
richer analysis of the realities of corporate governance has further
stunted Caremark’s ability to grow.
Goldman illustrates the proposition that even the responsible
monitoring of legal risks is unlikely to ensure actual corporate legal
compliance in the face of compensation schemes that create different
incentives. It is almost certainly the case that a Delaware court would
be uncomfortable evaluating the incentives created by compensation

104. See also Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016)
(incentives to bring in volume from the legally risky check-cashing business); Stone ex rel.
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (incentives to accommodate
profitable customers); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del Ch. 2009) (promise of
significant stock compensation if target share price is maintained); In re Dow Chemical Co., 2010
WL 66769 (Del Ch. 2010) (noting distinction between monitoring business risk and monitoring
fraudulent and criminal conduct).
105. Critical in the case as well was the absence of red flags. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., 2011
WL 4826104, at *20.
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schemes, asserting once again its incompetence to evaluate business
decisions. Goldman implies the way, by presenting the possibility of
reviewing the processes by which boards monitor potentially legally
risky compensation schemes in light of employees’ economic
incentives.
AIG is an easy case from a Caremark perspective. The complaint
survived motions to dismiss in a situation where blatant illegality was
obvious and the focus of the opinion was only on the inside directors
who allegedly took part in the company’s various schemes.106 While
the defendants certainly broke laws and paid enormous fines and
expenses consistent with traditional Caremark claims, the proximate
cause of a significant amount of the corporation’s losses were business
losses arising from business decisions (or non-decisions) that created
extraordinary risk for the company.107 Indeed, the complaint pleads
that defendants’ actions caused damage to the company’s reputation
and good will, increased its cost of capital, and led to “a loss of
business and business opportunities.”108 There certainly were
violations of law. But the complaint further alleges that defendants’
breaches of fiduciary duties included, among other things, “failing to
ensure that AIG not engage in any unsafe, unsound, or illegal business
practices . . . .”109
AIG110 involved a variety of alleged manipulations of the
company’s financial statements, tax avoidance schemes, conspiracies
with others to rig markets, and the sale of expert fraud assistance to
other companies, leading to $1.6 billion in fines (with regulatory
processes still proceeding at the time of the opinion) and a loss of $3.5
billion in the company’s equity. The scope, extent, and clear intent of
the manipulations were so extraordinary as to lead then-Vice
Chancellor Strine to pointedly describe AIG as a “criminal
organization.”111

106. The case was also easy because it involved a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a much easier standard for plaintiffs to plead than the more restrictive Rule 23.1. The Vice
Chancellor ruled that demand futility under Rule 23.1 had been satisfied by the special litigation
committee’s express neutrality with respect to plaintiffs’ demand. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 807.
107. Id. at 791.
108. First Amended Combined Complaint at 190, 193, Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965
A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 769-VCS), 2008 WL 4618463.
109. Id. at 192.
110. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 763.
111. Id. at 796.
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The court’s evaluation of plaintiff’s Caremark claim is anticlimactic. The complaint did not assert the absence, inadequacy, or
ignorance of internal controls “in one discrete instance of serious
wrongdoing.”112 There was no need for red flags. Rather, “[t]he
diversity, pervasiveness, and materiality of the alleged financial
wrongdoing at AIG is extraordinary,”113 leading to the almost
unavoidable inference that the defendants, who both knew of and
participated in the fraud, clearly knew that AIG’s internal controls and
monitoring system were inadequate. This was enough to sustain the
claim.
And then there is Massey.
D. In re Massey Energy Company Derivative and
Class Action Litigation114
Massey stands alone. It does so not because of the blatantly bad
misconduct at issue. After all, AIG and Rich also dealt with bad
behavior, although not leading (as far as I know) to death. Massey’s
importance is not in these facts.
Massey stands alone because of the kind of risks the company
took and the losses that they proximately caused. In this respect,
Massey is different from other Caremark cases.
In traditional Caremark cases, the losses claimed are the fines and
penalties imposed upon the corporation because of its violations of
law. In the blended cases, losses included fines and penalties but
additional losses were caused by bad business decisions. In Rich, for
example, the $120 million that allegedly disappeared in China likely
was a fraudulent payment, but it could also have been the result of a
risky business decision.115 In Desimone, the option backdating claim,
which survived a motion to dismiss because directors were interested,
arguably violated fiduciary duties, but loss was as a result of
insufficient payment to the corporation for the stock.116 The direct
losses at AIG were largely caused by fraudulent transactions that
resulted in substantial fines and penalties, but the allegedly significant
112. Id. at 799.
113. Id.
114. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011); see also In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484 (Del. Ch. 2017) (dismissing Caremark
complaint because plaintiffs lost derivative standing following the merger of Massey into Alpha).
115. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013).
116. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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reputational losses and increased cost of credit were losses arising
from business risks.117 AIG could well have suffered much of the loss
at issue by legal yet aggressive business decisions. In this case they
crossed the line into fraud.
The distinction between business losses occasioned by illegal
behavior and business risk is blurry. The blended cases are transitional
(conceptually, if not chronologically). One could perhaps argue that,
at least in cases like AIG and, to a lesser extent perhaps, Goldman,
business risk was at issue because of decisions to pursue especially
aggressive corporate policies.118 But the cases were not presented that
way.
Massey involved straightforward business risk. Of course, there
were multiple violations of laws and regulations, compliance with
which might have prevented the mine disaster that gave rise to the
litigation. But the losses in Massey were proximately caused by
violations of mine safety practices, not by the violation of mine safety
regulations.119 It wasn’t legal fines that were at issue but mass tort
liability, lost profits, and severely damaged reputation, all stemming
from an alleged business policy of placing profits above safety.120 The
violation of mine safety regulations, while paralleling this behavior,
were incidental to the harm.
Massey found itself confronted with extensive liability and
serious reputational harm following an explosion at one of its mines
that killed 29 miners.121 What made this accident more compelling
than a typical business failure is the position taken by Blankenship,
the company’s CEO, Inman, his friend and enabler, and a complacent
outside board—that Blankenship and the company knew far more
about mine safety than federal regulators. This attitude led them
consistently to violate federal mine safety laws. It was the company’s
117. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 763.
118. Perhaps the statement in the text sounds silly given the pervasive fraud at AIG. But one
does wonder whether aggression short of illegality might have produced a different result in light
of the fact that, as was not alleged in Citigroup, directors were intimately involved in the aggressive
conduct. Certainly the increased cost of credit would have been a possibility. Damaged reputation
might have been as well because, as an insurance company, AIG is heavily reliant on its reputation
(as is Citigroup). I raise the points merely to suggest that the line between highly aggressive
financial conduct and unlawful financial conduct may be a thin one.
119. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d.
120. There almost certainly were grounds for survivors’ tort claims regardless of the regulatory
regime.
121. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d at 487.
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clear policy to risk the lives of workers in order to maximize corporate
profit. It was management’s disregard of mine safety practices that led
to the mine disaster.122
This case was presented in an interesting posture. Following the
mining disaster, plaintiffs filed derivative suits to recover Massey’s
losses from the directors and responsible officers.123 Thereafter, the
board began to seek a merger partner because of the company’s
crippled financial position following the disaster, leading to a merger
of the company into Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.124 The merger
agreement said nothing about the derivative suits, which passed to
Alpha in the merger, thus making any judgment equally beneficial to
Alpha shareholders and Massey shareholders.125 Plaintiffs argued that
the board should have valued the derivative claim separately, excluded
it from its assets, and placed it in trust for the Massey shareholders.126
Thus the case involved an action to enjoin the merger.127 The court
dismissed the complaint.128
In order to reach this decision, the Vice Chancellor was required
to assess the derivative claims themselves, which centrally included a
Caremark claim.129 He had little trouble finding that the board likely
had failed to “make a good faith effort to ensure that Massey complied
with its legal obligations.”130 Enumerating the various red and yellow
flags waived at the board, including a series of mine safety violations,
122. This latter conclusion was made by a report commissioned by West Virginia’s governor.
Id. at 492. While Blankenship’s aggressiveness may have led Massey to appear to be more
irresponsible than other mine operators, the history of mining regulation is one of continual
challenges by operators to regulators. In 2009, 27.4% of all violations were appealed, and some
estimates suggest that mine owners were litigating 67% of all significant violations and penalties.
Patrick R. Baker, The American Coal Miner, the Forgotten Natural Resource: Why Legislative
Reforms Are a Viable Solution to Solving the Case Backlog Before the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission Sparked by Tougher Enforcement of New Coal Mining Health and
Safety Laws and Regulations, 13 VT. J. ENV. L. 141, 143–44 (2011). Few changes were made in
mine safety regulation during the preceding 30 years despite significant technological progress, id.
at 147, and it has been argued that the rigidity of the Mine Act (and its operation as a strict liability
statute) stifles the flexibility needed by operators to craft the safety solutions best suited to them.
Karen L. Johnston, The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977: Is It Suffering from a MidLife Crisis?, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 452 (2001).
123. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d at 487.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 497.
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continued adversity to the regulatory authority, repeated flouting of
mine safety rules, and increases in violations, the court concluded that
“there seems little doubt that a faithful application of the plaintifffriendly pleading standard would preclude a dismissal of [plaintiffs’]
claims at the pleading stage.”131 The court noted, “a fiduciary of a
Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by
knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.”132
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine was very careful in his articulation
of his analysis. That does not change what in fact he did.
The first observation is that, in making his evaluation of the
Caremark claims, the then-Vice Chancellor bent the line between
procedure and substance. It has long been a precept of Delaware
jurisprudence, clearly articulated in the passage from Citigroup quoted
above and of course in Caremark itself, that courts are to review only
the procedures by which the board makes its decision, and not the
substance of that decision. As Chancellor Allen noted:
What should be understood, but may not widely be
understood by courts or commentators . . . is that compliance
with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be
judicially determined by reference to the content of the board
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process
employed.133
Plaintiffs in Massey had alleged the board’s failure “to make a
good faith effort to ensure that Massey complied with applicable laws
designed to protect the safety of miners.”134 They further alleged that
Blankenship and a compliant board and management “fostered a
business strategy expressly designed to put coal production and higher
profits over compliance with the law.”135 Going on to challenge the
board’s good faith, the plaintiffs argued that, “[r]ather than respond to
numerous red and yellow flags by aggressively correcting the
131. Id.
132. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2011). At the time of the merger, the board had not made a decision as to whether to pursue
the derivative claims. Without much discussion, the court appears to have concluded that they
would survive Rule 23.1 pleading standards no matter what the board’s decision would be or would
have been. Id. at *21.
133. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
134. In re Massey Energy Co. , 2011 WL 2176479, at *19.
135. Id.
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management culture at Massey that allegedly put profits ahead of
safety, the Board allowed itself to continue to be dominated by
Blankenship.”136
Leaving aside the good faith implications of law violation for a
moment, what plaintiffs appear to have been alleging is that the board
made an affirmative business decision to accommodate Blankenship’s
policy, an observation that is bolstered by the fact that the board took
no steps to terminate Blankenship as CEO until his interference with
the merger led his friend and supporter, Inman, to suggest that he leave
his post. The support for this behavior as an affirmative business
decision is further supplied by the court’s inference that the board went
“through the motions” in the face of red flags, making no “good faith
efforts to ensure that Massey cleaned up its act.”137 Perhaps the
clearest indication that the court is actually reviewing a substantive
business decision comes in the following passage describing
plaintiffs’ allegations: “[I]nstead of using their supervisory authority
over management to make sure that Massey genuinely changed its
culture and made mine safety a genuine priority, the independent
directors are alleged to have done nothing of actual substance to
change the direction of the company’s real policy.”138
On the other hand, Chancellor Allen in Caremark:
That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after
the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees
of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or
“irrational,” provides no ground for director liability, so long
as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests.139
Stepping back to look at plaintiffs’ allegation, it should be
apparent that the issue is one of disagreement over a business decision.
There simply is no discussion of process. Indeed, in evaluating the
likelihood of the claim’s success, then-Vice Chancellor Strine
discusses the fact that the board did in fact engage in some sort of

136. Id.
137. Id. Although the board appeared somewhat passive in the face of Blankenship’s
domination, it is well to remember that “the decision not to act is just as much of a decision as a
decision to act.” La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 341 (Del. Ch. 2012).
138. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *19 (emphasis added).
139. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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monitoring process, which ordinarily would lead to the failure of the
oversight claim.140 The process brought about no change, but it is
standard Delaware jurisprudence to acknowledge that the failure to
make changes is itself a business decision.141 It seems evident that
plaintiffs are complaining about the board’s refusal to change its
business policy to one more attractive to the plaintiffs. Then-Vice
Chancellor Strine apparently accepted this allegation in evaluating the
claim as one that would withstand a motion to dismiss.
Even if one were to find a purely process-based evaluation here,
the evaluation of plaintiffs’ position suggests a breach of a different
core Delaware precept. The shareholder plaintiffs clearly are arguing
that the business policy they would have liked the board to pursue was
superior to the business policy the board actually did pursue. That is a
legal posture forbidden to shareholders, even in a derivative suit. For
one of the most unbreakable tenets of Delaware jurisprudence has
been that it is the board, and the board alone, that makes corporate
policy.142 No matter how much shareholders may disagree, their only
meaningful remedy is to replace the board with new members at the
next annual election.143 Thus the centerpiece of plaintiffs’ complaint
should have been a non-starter in a Delaware court.144
This brings me to the alleged legal violations, the hook upon
which the whole opinion hangs. After all, as Disney, Stone, and other
cases point out, knowingly causing the corporation to violate the law
is behavior not in good faith. In light of the confluence of the duty to
monitor with the duty of good faith,145 one might reply by pointing out
that the entire Caremark discussion is just good faith in other clothing.
And yet legal violations are really not the issue here. That is
where the good faith argument fails as a matter of reality. It is also
where the Vice Chancellor bent the legal risk-business risk barrier laid
out in Citigroup. The deaths of the miners, and thus the lion’s share of
the losses suffered by Massey, were the result of the mine explosion,

140. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20.
141. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 46 A.3d at 340–41.
142. In re Time Inc., C.A. No. 10670, 1989 WL 79880 (July 14, 1989).
143. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
144. The court discusses the shareholders’ role in electing directors in the context of an
assessment of the legitimate losses they can claim to have suffered, suggesting the “justice” of
shareholders suffering losses having experienced super-normal gains as a result of Massey’s bad
short-term behavior. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n.185.
145. Oklan, supra note 3.

51.1 MITCHELL_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2019 5:16 PM

270

[Vol. 51:239

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

not a violation of law in the manner contemplated by Caremark and
Stone. In fact, the Vice Chancellor recognized that the directors and
officers “could face large liability claims” based on lost mining profits
as well as settlements with miners’ families and fines.146 Lost mining
profits are not regulatory fines or criminal penalties. They are not, at
least here, the result of legal penalties. Moreover, mine safety
regulations, while they have the teeth of law behind them are based,
among other things, on best industry practices.147 Those practices
would exist regardless of whether they were articulated as matters of
positive law. It was the decision to save money by cutting corners on
safety standards that led to the mine disaster, not regulatory violations.
The Massey losses are conceptually and practically different from
corporate losses arising from the payment of criminal or regulatory
penalties, as was the case in Caremark and Stone. To see this, imagine
if federal mine safety regulations were more lax than they were,
permitting practices that were sub-optimal and posing greater risk to
miners. This is entirely plausible, and it is in fact the daily work of
regulatory agencies to make assessments of the costs and benefits of
regulation. Suppose federal mine safety rules exposed miners to at
least some of the dangers present at the Upper Big Branch mine.
Assume that Massey fully complied with these regulations. Or
suppose there were no regulations at all and Massey pursued an
aggressive cost-cutting policy leading to underinvestment in ideal (but
not legally-mandated) safety conditions. In either of these cases, the
explosion may have happened anyway. If so, the same workers would
have died, the same claims would have been made by survivors, the
same loss of profits would have occurred, and the company would
have suffered the same reputational damage. In fact, looking beyond
146. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n. 185; see also Verified Amended
Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 51, New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Pension Fund v. Blankenship,
2011 WL 2176497 (Del. Ch. 2010) (No. 5430-VCS), 2010 WL 2771297 at ¶¶ 139, 141 (consistent
failure to address poor safety conditions of mines leading to, among other things, reputation loss
and loss of shareholder value, violations of company’s internal policies, and severe reputational
harm); Verified Shareholder Consolidated Derivative Complaint at 2–3, 79, In re Massey Energy
Co. Derivative Litig. (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 5430-VCS), 2011 WL 190841 at ¶ 1 (board conscious
of putting profits over safety), ¶ 2(severe reputational harm and loss of shareholder value), ¶ 173
(disregard of internal as well as external safety regulations), ¶ 174 (board endorsed “patently unsafe
work conditions in order to minimize cost and maximize output”); Verified Shareholder Third
Amended Derivative and Class Action Complaint at 31, In re Massey Energy Co., 2017 WL
1739201 (Del. Ch. 2017) (No. 5430-VCS), 2011 WL 2028545 at ¶ 80 (lost profits from damaged
mine).
147. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (West 1979).
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the legal context, the then-Vice Chancellor himself implicitly
recognized this: “Subterranean mining will never be a risk-free or
entirely clean business. That is a reality . . . .”148 Seen this way, the
real importance of the mine safety regulations at issue in Massey was
to fit the case into a Caremark framework. The risks undertaken by
the company were business risks, not legal risks. The losses were a
result of risky business.149
Any doubt that a business decision, and hence business risk, was
at issue was laid to rest by Chancellor Bouchard in the most recent
iteration of the case decided in May 2017. Dismissing the derivative
litigation for plaintiffs’ loss of standing as a result of the merger, the
Chancellor quoted plaintiffs’ characterization of the fiduciary breach
as defendants’ “causing Massey to employ a deliberate and systematic
business plan of willfully disregarding both internal and external
safety regulations,” and noting that the allegations “would state a
viable derivative claim for relief under Caremark.”150
To be sure, one cannot say what the analysis of the lawsuit would
have been in the absence of a regulatory regime. Perhaps the legal
violations were a necessary hook to allow the court to find likely bad
faith without appearing to violate fundamental doctrinal principles of
Delaware jurisprudence. One wonders, however, whether a
contemporary court would really permit directors to escape liability
for causing workers’ deaths with the constructive knowledge that their
business plan was likely to do just that. Such a posture might have
passed muster in a 19th century court, but surely not today.
Shorn, then, of doctrinal rhetoric, Massey engaged in an
evaluation of the very type of business risk the Citigroup court so
pointedly rejected as part of Delaware jurisprudence. Then-Vice
Chancellor Strine did the right thing and, in so doing, provided a
means of infusing Caremark with meaning and giving teeth to the
notion of a monitoring board. Massey makes business risk reviewable.
While Massey belongs in its own category as a case decided by a
Delaware court, another case applying Delaware law to a Caremark
claim is instructive because of its similarity to Massey. Intuitive
148. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *23.
149. This is true even in the case of the miners’ survivors’ damages claims. Businesses regularly
evaluate the balance between risk, even to life, and profitability, as then-Vice Chancellor Strine
observed in Massey. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 984 (2009).
150. In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484, 487–88 (Del. Ch. 2017).
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Surgical involved plaintiffs’ allegations that the board knew that its
principal product was defective, took no steps to correct the defect,
and violated FDA regulations by engaging in covert (unreported)
recalls.151 Sustaining the complaint against a Rule 23.1 motion to
dismiss,152 the court identified the damages plaintiffs sought:
“Defendants’ misconduct harmed Intuitive’s reputation; damaged its
goodwill with the medical community, commentators, the press, and
the public; and resulted in a decline in stock price, revenue, and sales
for Intuitive.”153
None of these damages are regulatory but are, instead, clear
business losses. Like the losses in Massey, Intuitive suffered these
alleged losses in the presence of a regulatory regime. But the losses
plaintiff alleged could just have well been sustained in the absence of
such regulation. If Intuitive had concealed its product defects
(resulting in loss of life) from the medical community, the public, the
scholars, the commentators, and the press, precisely the same damages
would have arisen upon the ultimate revelation of the defects and
concealments.
Caremark jurisprudence already incorporates review of the
board’s failure to monitor business risk. All the courts have to do is
recognize this and make it explicit.
E. Discussion
I’m not so innocent as to suggest that Massey, taken alone,
represents a change in Delaware jurisprudence. Massey was an easy
case. The company’s business policy, at least as articulated by the
court, appears to have been despicable. There were indeed violations
of law. And the Vice Chancellor did not actually have to rule on the
Caremark claim itself, only that the allegations in the complaint were
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, thereby giving the derivative
claims at least some potential value in the merger.
There is something far more important that the case does
represent. Massey suggests that, when pressed by facts it finds
sufficiently compelling, a Delaware court can do all of the things that
Caremark jurisprudence says it cannot do. It can consider a business
151. In re Intuitive Surgical., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
152. This refers to Federal Rule 23.1, not Delaware Rule 23.1, but the court applied Delaware
law in its analysis.
153. In re Intuitive Surgical, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1114.
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decision as a business decision. It can even pass judgment on that
decision. Looking past doctrine to damages in Massey and the blended
cases paves a way forward to developing doctrine that has the potential
to give real teeth to the duty to monitor and to make monitoring a
meaningful directorial occupation.
Nothing in the nature or function of the monitoring board would
lead to the conclusion that its only monitoring function is to monitor
legal risks. The doctrinal limitation to legal risks is disappointing and
inconsistent with reality. After all, just as judges are not business
experts, directors are not legal experts. Perhaps legal risks are the most
externally obvious and easy to identify causes of significant corporate
financial loss, but neither the Delaware General Corporation Law nor
the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, which laid out the case
for, and established, the modern monitoring board, limit the board’s
responsibilities to monitoring legal risk.154 Delaware’s statute simply
states that “the business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .”155 The mandate of the board is powerful and
broad, giving it the sole responsibility for business decisionmaking.156 Limiting the board’s legal responsibilities (or at least the
extent of its enforceable responsibilities) to monitoring legal risk
seems, at a minimum, rather inconsistent with its statutory and judicial
mandate.
Moreover, the board has changed from the time of Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers and even Caremark. Not only has it changed from
managing to monitoring, but it has also evolved from a pastime to a
real paying job. When Caremark was decided, corporate directors
earned median base compensation of $33,750 in manufacturing
companies, $31,700 in non-financial services companies, and $30,200
in financial services companies.157 Median stock option grants were
$45,000.158 Median director compensation at the Fortune 500
companies was $260,200 in 2016 (with cash compensation of
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2008).
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
156. See generally Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
157. KAY WORELL, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S COMPENSATION IN 1997: A RESEARCH
REPORT (The Conference Board 1998).
158. Id.
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$105,000).159 Whatever the legitimacy of the court’s unsubstantiated
fear of insufficient qualified board candidates may have been, board
members today are paid real money. In fact an outside director’s
income solely from a Fortune 500 board seat puts him (or sometimes
her) in the top 6.6% of American household income.160 While it is true
that board members are expected to have some expertise in business
(although the famous exonerated Disney board gives something of the
lie to that frequent assertion), I suspect that there are many highly
intelligent business and finance professionals with incomes far below
that of the typical board member who, with a little training, could serve
as competent directors and who might have the incentive to do so
because the money would actually mean something to them.
After all, a corporation’s legal department, working perhaps with
an outside legal auditor just as its financial department works with an
outside auditor, ought to be able to do a better and more
comprehensive job than the board does, certainly better than is
expected under the Caremark standard. Why not simply leave in place
a CEO, monitored by securities analysts and outside experts, and save
us all the trouble, expense, and litigation of a board in the first place?
One reason that is often repeated is that somebody is needed to
monitor the CEO. The previous paragraph gave one possibility for
accomplishing this goal without a board. Another possibility is the
web of external regulations in which the board is embedded,
suggesting compliance regimes and their internal compliance
requirements provide a new, if troubling, form of corporate
governance,161 which would focus on legal risk. But the realization of
legal risk is hardly the only way for a corporation to lose money.
The argument is often made that directors are part time workers
(although with significantly higher incomes than most part-timers),
with full time day jobs and little time to attend to the corporation’s
affairs. Whatever the legitimacy of this argument in 1963 or even
1996, the world has changed. Contemporary directors can do so much

159. Compensation for Outside Corporate Directors Stabilizing, Willis Towers Watson Study
Finds, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (July 27, 2017), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/press/
2017/07/compensation-for-outside-corporate-directors-stabilizing.
160. Percentage Distribution of Household Income in the United States in 2016, STATISTA
(Sept. 2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/203183/percentage-distribution-of-household-in
come-in-the-us/.
161. Griffith, supra note 3.
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more in the limited time available. This observation brings me to the
second aspect of Caremark’s promise.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RED FLAGS
A. The Issue
There are two kinds of red flags present in the cases: internal red
flags and external red flags.162 As in the case of business risk,
Delaware jurisprudence already implicitly incorporates the breadth of
red flags necessary to realize Caremark’s potential. Understanding the
differences between the two kinds of flags and the relevance of those
differences is important to evaluating what directors knew or should
have known about corporate problems and to developing the kind of
comprehensive doctrine that achieves the level of directorial
responsibility at which Caremark purports to aim.
In accepting Caremark as Delaware law, the Supreme Court
interpreted its standard of knowing indifference to require that
directors have actual rather than constructive knowledge of the
corporate conduct at issue in order to sustain liability.163 Because the
situation of each director is likely to be different and liability appears
to turn on an individual state of mind, the court describes this as
requiring a subjective evaluation of each director’s scienter.164
The actual knowledge requirement is doctrinally a little peculiar.
Caremark itself was a reaction to the earlier Allis-Chalmers case in
which the court absolved the board of a duty of inquiry in the absence
of their knowledge or constructive knowledge of any wrongdoing.165
Caremark imposed a duty of monitoring that would ensure, or at least
make more likely, that information about internal illegal conduct
would reach the board, thus replacing the don’t ask don’t look
incentive established by Allis-Chalmers with a requirement to have
information transmission systems in place and to monitor those
systems.166 In this respect it was a significant advance beyond AllisChalmers. Yet the knowledge requirement has returned.167 Caremark,

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See infra notes 163–172 and accompanying text.
Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
Id.
Arlen, supra note 3.
Id.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
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at least in theory, makes it more likely that the board will acquire
knowledge.
Doctrinally, this knowledge requirement derives from the notion
of bad faith. In Stone v. Ritter the court identified two kinds of bad
faith in the context of oversight liability. The first is found when a
board “utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system
or controls.”168 The second occurs when directors’ conscious failure
“to monitor or oversee” the operations of the monitoring system
prevents them from being informed.169 “In either case, imposition of
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not
discharging their fiduciary obligations,”170 in other words, scienter.171
A plaintiff can satisfy the knowledge requirement, at least
sufficiently to withstand a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss, by pleading
with particularity the presence of red (and sometimes yellow) flags
which should have alerted directors to the presence of wrongdoing, or

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. I do not explore the meaning of good faith in depth in this paper because the Delaware
courts’ reduction of the concept to scienter in oversight cases seems well-established (and because
my discussion of red flags jurisprudence reveals the potential expansion of the boundaries of
scienter), conversance with the debate about its meaning during the evolution of the concept as
judicially applied provides helpful context for understanding the relatively reductive nature of its
understanding by the courts. The literature on good faith is substantial, although diminished after
the Delaware Supreme Court’s limitation of the concept in Stone. See Christopher M. Bruner, Good
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006) (exposing good faith as one of several complicating factors leading
to jurisprudential confusion and complexity); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter
and The Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) (using good faith to expand
the spectrum of fiduciary obligation): Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith,
and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (exploring the manner in which good faith could be
used to overcome intractable structural bias problems); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (drawing on scienter to give good faith functional meaning);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006)
(engaging in a careful analysis of the meaning of good faith and arguing for its normative
desirability as a matter of Delaware jurisprudence); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005)
(analyzing good faith as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard); Leo Strine et al.,
Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629
(2010) (examining good faith’s place in Delaware jurisprudence and noting the expansion of the
duty of loyalty beyond conflict claims and defining it as the negative duty not to act in bad faith);
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441 (2007) (contrasting meaning of
good faith with “not in bad faith” and arguing that significant substantive consequences follow
from the language); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director’s Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 457 (2007)
(working to provide a definition of good faith that enhances board accountability).
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at least sufficient evidence thereof to have stimulated them to attend
to their monitoring machinery.
While the court has separated flags by color, it has overlooked a
more fundamental difference in the nature of the information that
would underlie them; internal and external information.
This is understandable. After all, the goal of Caremark internal
monitoring systems is to discover wrongdoing within the corporation,
for that is where liability-creating activity occurs. But information
about the corporation and potential wrongdoing often is generated
outside the corporation as well, information that is relevant both to
regulatory losses and to business losses.
The first type of information, internal information, is generated
within the corporation, through the conduct and behavior of
employees in the ordinary course of business, and ideally flows up to
the board through the monitoring mechanisms required by Caremark.
Members of the board typically learn of this kind of information at
board meetings and committee meetings.
The second type of information is external information. External
information originates in newspaper articles, government and
regulatory investigations and reports, television news and
documentaries, social media like LinkedIn postings, and the like.
Members of the board currently learn of this kind of information in the
same manner as does the general public.
One might expect that directors should be required to be more
attentive to internal information, given their responsibility to monitor
the corporation. But, for reasons I will discuss, the contemporary
monitoring board’s structure and modern technology lead to the
conclusion that members of the board should be required to be more
attentive to external information.
My analysis proceeds in three steps. First is an examination of the
cases, demonstrating the unacknowledged presence of both types of
red flags. Then I will explain why the board is more likely to be better
informed by external information than internal information in the case
of a misbehaving corporation. Finally, I will discuss the board’s ability
to channel and receive that information as easily (if not more so) as it
can obtain internal information.
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B. The Cases
The few cases in which Caremark claims survive a Rule 23.1
motion to dismiss are instructive. In re China Agritech, Inc.172
involved a company that essentially was a fraudulent operation for the
benefit of its founders. This Caremark claim survived largely because
the Audit Committee and the board were dysfunctional. Yet the Audit
Committee undertook a formal (if ultimately insufficient)
investigation of allegations made, among other places, in an
externally-generated report by a “self-described consultant and private
investor with more than ten years of business experience” in China
and
Southeast
Asia.173
Published
on
the
website
www.seekingalpha.com, the report went into great detail describing
the absence of any meaningful business and operations of the
company.174 While the board appears to have been sufficiently corrupt
as to need no red flags, and while its investigation of this report was
cursory and appears to have been predetermined, the report was
significant to the plaintiff’s establishment of a well-pleaded
complaint.175
In Rich v. Chong, another case surviving a motion to dismiss, one
of three actionable red flags was an externally-generated NASDAQ
letter threatening the company with delisting if it failed to bring its
internal systems up to SEC requirements.176 In Saito v. McCall, a
substantial portion of the defendant board members were put on notice
following information discovered during due diligence of its merger
partner, information arguably generated internally but not information
that would have arisen through the kind of monitoring systems
contemplated by Caremark.177 In Pyott, one of the most significant red
flags that the court said should have put the board on notice of internal
wrongdoing was information provided by the FDA to the company
about the activities of an outside sponsored speaker at company-held

172. 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. at *4–5.
175. In re China Agritech is, admittedly, an imperfect case for an example because so much
bad conduct was going on internally. At the same time, it is only in those cases of really bad conduct
that Rule 23.1 dismissal motions are sustained.
176. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2013).
177. Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2004), overruled by Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010).
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dinners.178 In Massey, the court cited newspaper accounts of the
company’s bad behavior as well as an official West Virginia report
issued after the mining disaster blaming Massey’s management for the
event and government (externally generated) citations.179 In Abbott
Depakote, the district court, applying Delaware law, identified
externally-generated red flags that included a letter from the US
Department of Justice to Abbott’s law department informing it that the
DOJ was investigating its off-label marketing of Depakote, directing
the company not to destroy documents, and informing it that the DOJ
planned to issue subpoenas.180 The court treated these subpoenas as a
second red flag and noted that these two “new” red flags (newly
pleaded after the court’s Rule 23.1 dismissal of an earlier complaint)
had been waved in the board’s face “or displayed so that they are
visible to the careful observer.”181
A final example is Intuitive Surgical, another case surviving a
Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss, where the court relied on red flags that
were indisputably external.182 The company had violated FDA
regulations by, among other things, failing to file required FDA
reports regarding complaints of defects in its leading product, and
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, including the outside directors,
both knew of the defects and “authorized or turned a blind eye to three
covert corrective actions” undertaken by the company.183 The plaintiff
pled three red flags; two scholarly articles published in medical
journals reporting on the product failure, and 95 products liability suits
against the company.184 The court concluded that “it is reasonable to
infer that scholarly studies evaluating the da Vinci system and its
performance would be known by the board.”185

178. L.A. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (FDA letters
were significant red flags in a parallel federal case applying Delaware law).
179. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2011).
180. In re Abbott Depakote, No. 11 C 8114, 2013 WL 2451152, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2013).
181. Id. at *7. A Caremark claim survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss in Saito on grounds
that the directors had actual knowledge of financial irregularities. In an earlier iteration of the case,
Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000), the complaint was
dismissed without prejudice. I will discuss the red flags at issue below because they technically
appeared in a dismissed case.
182. In re Intuitive Surgical, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
183. Id. at 1111.
184. Id. at 1116.
185. Id. at 1117.
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One can wonder whether a Delaware court would go so far as to
hold outside directors responsible for knowing the contents of
scholarly medical journals. But that is not important to Intuitive’s
relevance. Relevant is the fact that the court saw no need to distinguish
between internal and external red flags, implicitly acknowledging that
the board is responsible for noticing material information about the
company regardless of source.
These examples are of red flags in the few cases where the board’s
behavior was sufficiently egregious to support a Caremark complaint
beyond the pleading stage. It is hard to know how significant they
might independently have been because the patterns of misbehavior
and corruption in which they were embedded were so severe that it
would have been hard for a responsible court to have dismissed them.
Cases dismissed at the pleading stage where such pervasive
misconduct was lacking follow a similar pattern of including external
and internal red flags. For example, the court in Horman v. Abney186
identified four red flags.187 Two of these were internally generated, but
two were external—an Assurance of Discontinuance Agreement
imposed by the State of New York and allegations from the City and
State of New York that the company was not in compliance with the
AOD.188 The court made no distinction as to the relative relevance of
the internal and external red flags, dismissing the complaint because
the board had in fact taken action in response to them.189 In Dow
Chemical, an external red flag was a publicly alleged bribery
charge.190 The court, without commenting on its external origin,
dismissed it as “not a ‘red flag’” because of the unreliability of the
source.191 All of the alleged red flags in Citigroup were external,
including newspaper articles, a Bloomberg report, credit-rating
downgrades by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, and a Freddie Mac
announcement, among others.192 While concluding that the alleged red
flags had no specific connection to Citigroup and therefore were

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
2010).
191.
192.

C.A. No.12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. 2017).
Id. at *10.
Id. at *3, *10–14.
Id. at *14–15.
In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *12–13 (Del Ch. Jan. 11,
Id.
In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 115, 128 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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insufficient to support scienter, the court made no distinction between
the sources of these red flags and internally generated information.193
All of the red flags in Melbourne were external, consisting of
investigations and the imposition of significant penalties by the
Korean and Japanese antitrust authorities.194 Interestingly, Vice
Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves somewhat ambiguously observed
that she did not need to decide whether these matters actually
constituted red flags because plaintiffs had failed adequately to plead
that the Qualcomm board’s response constituted bad faith.195 She went
on to analyze the complaint on the assumption that they were red
flags.196
Four red flags were pleaded in Ash v. McCall,197 three of which
were external and consisted of a Bloomberg report, two reports by an
independent institutional investor research organization, and articles
in The Atlanta Constitution.198 The court again did not distinguish
between the sources of the red flags, dismissing the complaint because
they were overcome by “green flags,” positive reports to the board by
its accounting firm and investment bank, on which the court held the
board was entitled to rely.199
The distinction between internal information and external
information is an important one if Caremark jurisprudence is to realize
its potential. Contrary to what might be expected, I will argue that a
requirement that directors pay attention to external red flags at least as
much as internal red flags is more likely to lead to meaningful
monitoring. I don’t at all dismiss the duty to monitor internal
information. After all, this is the kind of information that the board is
meant to access through internal monitoring systems. But for reasons
I will discuss, it may well be that external information is more reliably

193. The court did note that the alleged red flags were little more than “public documents,” but
the importance of this observation goes to the fact that they “reflected the worsening conditions in
the subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally” and did not specifically address
Citigroup’s situation. Id.
194. Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund ex rel. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No.
10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369, at *3–4, *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 449 (Del.
2017).
195. Id. at *9.
196. Id.
197. Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
198. Id.
199. Id. at *9–10.
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available to the board. It is also technologically rather easily
accessible.
C. Structural Holes and Information Blockage
I begin by repeating the observation that the average public board
today is an independent monitoring board, in contrast to the managing
boards that sat prior to the 1980s.200 This difference marks an
important distinction in directors’ access to information. In an earlier
study I explored the theory of structural holes to show how the
composition of a board affects information control and access.201 In a
board composed of a mix of inside and outside directors, information
flows to outside directors both through the CEO and through board
insiders. These inside directors have their own independent sources of
information deep within the corporation as a result of their day-to-day
work and are not solely reliant for their information on the CEO. While
circumstantial reasons might exist in certain cases for insiders to
restrict the information they are willing to give their outsider
colleagues,202 it is theoretically possible, and indeed probable, that
information flows at least somewhat horizontally around the board.
In contrast, with a board composed of outsiders except for the
CEO, information flows to outside directors only one way: through the
CEO himself. Boards will receive reports from corporate employees,
but those employees are unlikely to have the kind of independent
relationships with outside directors that board colleagues will have
with one other, and are unlikely ever to stray from the script approved
by the CEO.203 It is, therefore, probable that the information available
to outside directors will be more controlled and constricted in outsider
boards than in insider boards.
AIG presents a case in which cooperation in the active internal
concealment of information by the CEO204 was probably necessary for
the insiders to sustain their fraudulent schemes.205 Even a case devoid

200. Gordon, supra note 8, at 1465, 1475.
201. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and the Missing Link in Corporate
Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005).
202. The fear of being fired might be one.
203. Fear of firing again presents itself.
204. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 774, 795–96 (Del. Ch. 2009).
205. In Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 916–17 (Del. Ch. 2007), the two insiders on the
board were not recipients of the options at issue.
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of evidence of actual wrongdoing, like Citigroup,206 presents a
situation where insiders might prefer to prevent outside directors from
being fully-informed of their activities.207
The distinction between types of red flags and the problem of
structural holes is nicely illustrated by Sandys v. Pincus. Shortly after
the company completed its IPO, it requested that its underwriters
waive their lockup provision so that certain employee-shareholders
(including directors) could participate in a secondary offering of the
stock.208 It so happened that, at the time of the request and the
secondary offering, these insiders allegedly knew that the company’s
financials significantly overstated its financial performance.209 When
the company restated its financials, the stock price dropped 81 percent
over a six-month period.210 In dismissing the complaint, the court
noted that the outside directors had not been given the relevant
financial information.
Of course not. If the insiders had disclosed the company’s true
financial condition to the outsiders as they prepared to sell their stock
in a secondary offering that significantly overpriced the shares, it is
likely that a responsible board would have prohibited the offering.
While Sandys and AIG are extreme, they are good illustrations of the
problems that outside directors can face when seeking information on
an almost completely outsider board. Internal information may be
concealed and thus unavailable. As the cases surveyed in Part II.b
illustrate, external information may be more plentiful and reliable.
This analysis shows that it may be more likely that directors on
independent boards will be put on notice of wrongdoing by external
red flags than by internal red flags. It is for this reason that I argue that
boards should be held to a higher explicit expectation of Caremark
good faith notice by external information. As was true with respect to

206. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 129 (Del. Ch. 2009).
207. One reason might be compensation incentives, as in the Goldman case. In re The Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct.
12, 2011). Citigroup didn’t squarely place the issue of compensation on the table but it is reasonable
to think that the employee compensation schemes in the two corporations were not dramatically
different.
208. Sandys v. Pincus, No. 9512-CB, 2016 WL 769999, at *3 (Del Ch. Feb. 29, 2016), rev’d,
152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016).
209. Id.
210. Id. at *4. As I noted in Part I, it is interesting to observe that the nature of the derivative
damages claimed by plaintiffs was unclear.
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the business decisions I discussed in Part I, the tools already exist in
the cases.
The importance of holding outside directors responsible for
external red flags is underscored by an observation made by the
Delaware courts themselves. Wrongdoers generally don’t leave paper
trails.211 This undoubtedly correct observation suggests yet another
limitation on the utility of internally-generated information. If
Caremark is to have real teeth or, to put it differently, if the duty to
monitor is to mean something, it seems as if external red flags are the
avenue by which this will happen.
D. The Duty to Monitor in a World of Information
The realization that external red flags may provide more and
better information to independent directors than internal red flags
leads to further analysis. Courts frequently repeat the assertion that
independent directors have limited time to give to corporate affairs. It
is possible that this observation would lead them to demand less of
directors with respect to external red flags, no matter how much better
and more available is this kind of information.
Delaware courts have not done this, in part perhaps because they
have not acknowledged the distinction. But the analysis is important.
I certainly do not mean to discourage Delaware courts from expecting
directors to rely on external red flags. But there is no reason for them
to be discouraged, even on the assumption that independent directors
have limited time because, as I shall argue, limited time is all it would
take for independents to inform themselves of external red flags. Thus
the facts argue for an enhanced duty to monitor external red flags.
It is important to be precise about what a heightened requirement
that directors attend to external red flags would mean. Chancellor
Chandler wrote in Citigroup that Caremark requires directors to
ensure that “reasonable reporting and information systems exist that
would allow directors to know about and prevent wrongdoing that
211.See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 357 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(“[S]adly, sophisticated corporate actors at times engage in illegal behavior and attempt to hide
their misconduct with the appearance of legal compliance.”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg,
965 A.2d 763, 795 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“That inference is that those who engage in sophisticated
forms of financial fraud do their best not to leave an obvious paper trail. Rather, consistent with
their improper objectives, those at the top of such schemes try to conceal their roles and not leave
marked paths leading to their doorsteps.”).
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could cause losses for the Company.”212 This is an objective inquiry
that necessarily looks at the world beyond doctrinal doors. And
judicial review of corporate monitoring systems is procedural. Courts
generally do not evaluate whether the system is a good one or not.213
That would be a violation of fundamental principles of Delaware
law.214 Judicial review of the procedures by which a board adopted an
external red flag monitoring system would be consistent with
Delaware process jurisprudence.
The review of the reasonableness of reporting and information
systems is a matter of process. Directors’ scienter necessary to sustain
a Caremark claim is said to be a subjective evaluation of directorial
intent. The two connect where the presence of a reasonable reporting
and information system brings red flags to directors’ attention, red
flags which they then disregard at their peril. One can, therefore,
attribute scienter only to directors who one reasonably would have
expected to see red flags and act upon them.215
What may be considered “reasonable” changes over time.
Behavior that might be considered reasonable in one age may no
longer be considered reasonable as human knowledge and technology
develop. Thus, the reasonable driver in control of a 1920 Model T on
the roadways of that time would perhaps be forgiven for conduct
considered unreasonable by the driver of any modern automobile on
any modern city street or highway. A reasonable manufacturer of
canned food products at the turn of the twentieth century undoubtedly
faced a different concept of reasonableness than would a similar
manufacturer today.
The same might be true for corporate directors, but the courts of
Delaware have developed the jurisprudence of red flags without
explicit regard to changes in its own analogue of automotive and food
safety, the world of information. I don’t think it requires proof to say
that this world has changed dramatically since Caremark was decided.
A reasonable reporting and information system in 2017 should be
expected to be based upon these technological developments. Given
212. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009).
213. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Obviously the
level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business
judgment.”).
214. See id. (referencing the business judgement rule).
215. That is to say, if the red flags were waved in the director’s face. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d
136, 143 (Del. 2008).
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the importance of external red flags in keeping directors informed,
directors should be charged with the responsibility of taking advantage
of this new technology.
The counter argument will almost certainly be the standard one:
we do not want drivers and food processors to take risks with our
safety. We do want directors to take risks. But the objection is
incomplete. Even with respect to drivers and food processors, we
balance our desire to diminish their risk-taking with the realities of the
activity. We want people to drive, so we determine an optimal level of
safety by roughly calibrating the cost of diminished risk to a point
beyond which the activity is diminished to unacceptable levels. So too,
with food processors. So too, with directors.
All that courts need to do is to balance the risks in light of the
realities. And the job of Delaware courts in evaluating the manner in
which boards balance this risk in their specific corporate contexts is
probably considerably easier than in other tort contexts. While driver
liability and products liability look to the actual substance of behavior,
all Delaware courts really need to do is to look at the board process by
which its reporting and information systems are designed. If the
process is reasonable in light of the corporation’s business, regulatory
environment, and overall risk profile, then the inquiry is complete and
the directors are absolved, unless of course red flags put directors on
notice of corporate wrongdoing.
Embracing this reality changes the cost calculus and provides a
path towards making monitoring more meaningful. A single
information officer or corporate librarian can easily be tasked with
creating a system that automatically captures newspaper and
regulatory agency announcements about their corporations.216 While
some companies receive more public attention than others, the labor
is essentially the same and the work is performed automatically and
mechanically. From a corporate perspective, the accumulation of this
information is nearly costless.
But that is not the objection. The objection would be that busy
directors have no time to read the information. This objection is
considerably overstated. In the first place, most corporations just don’t
receive that much press. While Apple generated more than 1,150,000

216. It is almost certainly the case that corporations already designate this responsibility to one
or more corporate employees.
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Google entries in 2016, Publix Super Markets generated only 5,020.
This may seem like a lot, but a quick tour through the first 10 pages or
so of Google results for Apple showed nothing that might be relevant
to a director. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that any news of
real importance will eventually find its way to the major national
papers and the principal local papers where the corporation does
business, thus diminishing the number of sources directors could be
expected to read. Sorting mechanisms established by a corporate
librarian would presumably winnow these down considerably. Finally,
a glance at the headline and the lede paragraph of any article should
readily allow a director to decide whether it is necessary to read more.
The amount of labor that is likely to be required is hardly unreasonable
to expect for a director earning the Fortune 500 average of
$260,000.217
It is not my purpose to prescribe the kinds of external information
reporting systems that any given corporation will adopt, for surely that
will change with the specific corporation and depend upon factors like
its size, the nature of its industry, the extent of its regulatory regime,
the geographical scope of its operations and its sales, and the like. A
reasonable reporting and information system for Apple will likely be
different from a reasonable reporting and information system for
Publix Super Markets, as will a reasonable reporting and information
system for a corporation in a regulated industry like Caremark. The
judicial evaluation of what is a reasonable monitoring system for
external information should focus on the same kinds of board
processes as are used for evaluating the reasonableness of monitoring
systems for internal information.
The concept of “reasonable” has changed. Delaware courts
should acknowledge this and incorporate it into their jurisprudence.
Wal-Mart Stores illustrates the ease and importance of acquiring
this kind of information.218 When The New York Times reported on an
alleged bribery scheme at Wal-Mart, derivative suits were filed in
Arkansas and Delaware.219 The Delaware plaintiffs did their
homework by demanding access to Wal-Mart’s books and records.220
217. See Chris Morris, Pay Raises for Corporate Board Members Far Outpace Average
Americans’, FORTUNE (Oct. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/18/board-of-directors-pay/.
218. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 7455-CB, 2016 WL 2908344, at *21 (Del. Ch. May
13, 2016), supplemented, 167 A.3d 513 (Del. Ch. 2017).
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id.
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The Arkansas plaintiffs were less diligent and, before the Delaware
plaintiffs had arrived at the pleadings stage, were dismissed on a Rule
23.1 motion by the Arkansas court.221 The Delaware defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of issue preclusion.222
Among the questions addressed by the Delaware court was
whether an Arkansas court would consider a plaintiff who failed to
demand corporate books and records before filing a derivative suit to
be an adequate corporate representative.223 Ruling from Delaware law,
the court decided that an Arkansas court would not view such a
plaintiff as inadequate, contributing to its decision to dismiss the
complaint based on issue preclusion.224
In light of Delaware’s repeated and sometimes strident
admonitions “to use the tools at hand” to ensure that derivative suit
pleadings are sufficiently particular, this ruling seems strange. But the
court seemed to recognize that the tools had changed. The Arkansas
plaintiffs had not sought books and records from the corporation.
“But, as their counsel attests, crucial excerpts from a number of
key documents underlying the New York Times article were available
on the article’s webpage.”225 In her view, these underlying documents
“provided sufficient particularized allegations to surmount the
demand futility hurdle.”226 “Several of the documents from the
article’s webpage were featured in both complaints, including one of
the most crucial excerpts from Wal-Mart’s internal reports—the
statement that ‘there is reasonable suspicion to believe that Mexican
and USA laws may have been violated.’”227 The court continued,
“Plaintiffs found that statement important enough to quote it nine
times in the Delaware Complaint and to feature it in their supplemental
briefing as well.”228 “This key phrase was included in the excerpts on
the New York Times website and was relied upon extensively in the
Arkansas Complaint.”229

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Arkansas plaintiffs had not used the traditional “tools at
hand,” the very same tools available at the time of Caremark.230
Indeed the court remarked that perhaps it would have been better for
the plaintiffs to have done so, apparently limiting that phrase to refer
to Delaware section 220.231 But, in an implicit recognition that the
tools have changed, the court concluded that the Arkansas plaintiffs
were nevertheless adequate class representatives.232
III. CONCLUSION
As others have observed, the corporate scandals of the turn of the
century and the corporate irresponsibility that brought about the 2008
financial crisis have heightened public awareness of the central role of
the board of directors not only in ensuring good corporate
management but also, in a broader sense, the smooth and efficient
functioning of the American economy. While Caremark appeared to
offer promise, subsequent jurisprudence can lead to the conclusion
that corporate boards appear generally to have been absolved of
meaningful monitoring responsibility. Yet the contemporary board
model and the consequent composition of boards leaves monitoring as
their job, and demands that they engage in meaningful monitoring in
order to fulfill it.
A close look at the cases suggests that Caremark jurisprudence in
fact has been evolving, at least conceptually, towards the development
of a meaningful monitoring role. The way has been blocked, however,
by a relentless judicial and scholarly focus on doctrinal formulae.
Excavating beneath the doctrine reveals that the elements necessary to
construct a meaningful monitoring duty already exists.
It is my hope to have encouraged the Delaware courts to put the
pieces together. A duty to monitor business risk is already emergent
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. It is worth noting a significant asymmetry between the knowledge plaintiffs are expected
to have to survive a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss and the knowledge directors are obligated to have
in monitoring the corporation, a mismatch that favors directors. While plaintiffs are required to
“use the tools at hand” to discover adequate facts, directors are under no such obligation. To the
contrary, they are permitted repose until a red flag is ‘waved in their faces.’ Wood v. Baum, 953
A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008). Yet the same technology—the same tools—that have developed since
Caremark are as available to the directors as to the plaintiffs. In fact, given their respective roles,
the kind of information relevant to Caremark claims is far easier obtained by boards than plaintiffs.
And, in light of the dramatic differences in their respective powers and responsibilities to their
corporations and, indeed, to the economy in which they function, sound thinking would tell us that
this mismatch is backwards.

51.1 MITCHELL_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2019 5:16 PM

290

[Vol. 51:239

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

and should be refined and acknowledged if the monitoring board is to
have any real meaning. The obligation of directors to be informed
about their corporations has never been easier to fulfill. Caremark’s
hidden promise should thus be realized.

